Resumen: El objeto de este ensayo es explorar la base legal del principio de RtP, una noción que ha atraído debates profundos y la atención de doctrinarios desde la última década, y para determinar cuáles de estos aspectos han cristalizado en leyes positivas internacionales. Por lo tanto, el autor analizará las fuentes del derecho internacional como se contempla en el artículo 38 del Estatuto de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. Se encontrará que partes de RtP están comprimidas por instrumentos ya existentes internacionales y prácticas de los Estados también como opiniones jurídicas de Estados y apoyo de las Naciones Unidas una responsabilidad para reaccionar ante el sufrimiento humano. 
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stead of speaking of a right to intervention, the notion of a Responsibility to Protect (RtP) has gained ground. 6 This essay will try to explore the question of whether and in which of its aspects the RtP concept forms part of positive international law. After giving a short overview of the evolution of the notion of RtP and thus developing a definition for further discussion, I will attempt to anchor this principle in the recognized sources of international law as conceived by Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 7 . While much of recent scholarly debate concerning the RtP's legal status has cantered around its customary character, this work will analyze treaty law and general principles of international law as well. It will be argued that the RtP has emerged as a general principle of international law.
Finally, it will be discussed which ramifications flow from this supposition; especially what influence the crystallization of the RtP into a positive legal norm could potentially have on the attitude of actors on the international plane.
II. the notion of "Responsibility to pRotect"
The three documents generally seen as most important for conceptualizing the basic idea of a RtP are the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Report of the High Level Panel and the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document which therefore have attracted deepened scholarly attention and debate. 8 However, the notions of a RtP used by them vary extensively with respect to scope, prerequisites and means of this responsibility. 190 
The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
In 2000, as an answer to the UN's failure to react to the genocidal acts in Rwanda and Srebrenica 9 the Canadian government initiated and sponsored an expert group -the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Its task was to develop a solution for the felt paralysis of the system of collective security presumably caused by the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. 10 Hence, the goal was to find international consensus beyond the notion of "humanitarian intervention" despite the perceived loss of authority of the UN in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention of the NATO states. 11 In its report from 2001 12 the ICISS was the first institution to develop a holistic concept of a RtP. It conceived the principle in three forms: a responsibility to prevent, 13 a responsibility to react, 14 comprising, ultima ratio, military means, and a responsibility to rebuild. 15 
A. From Right to Responsibility
A manifest obstacle proponents of a right to humanitarian intervention had to overcome, was that such an idea runs counter to the principle of sovereign equality of all states as stipulated in Art. 2 para. 1 UN 9 For background information please cf. Carlsson Report, supra note 1 and Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 "The fall of Srebrenica", UN Doc. A/ 54/649 (1999) . 10 Thakur, R., "The responsibility to protect", in Thakur, R., (ed.), The United Nations, Peace and Security. From 191 Charter. 16 On of the greatest achievements of the ICISS-Report now can be seen in the reinterpretation of sovereignty as implying responsibility towards one's own people. 17 The formerly state-centric approach shifts in favor of the endangered people, which constitutes a ground-breaking refocusing on the individual. 18 The ICISS expert panel therefore draws the conclusion that sovereignty is conditional 19 -in the case of inability or unwillingness of the home-state to prevent large-scale and widespread human suffering, an "international responsibility" comes into play, which is not limited by the principle of non-intervention. 20 
B. Addressees
The ICISS emphasizes that the primary duty to rectify a grave humanitarian situation lies with the state in which's borders such situation exists; in the case of its failure to remediate the situation, however, the responsibility falls back to the international community. 21 The Security Council is still held the most appropriate organ for authorization of military interventions. 22 Moreover, and this is what became the stone of contention, other avenues than action under Chapter VII UN Charter are considered. 24 If the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or if it fails to deal with it within a reasonable time, the UN General Assembly (General Assembly), pursuant to the "Uniting for Peace" -procedure, 25 or regional organisations 26 are allowed to intervene.
C. Preconditions
The Report provides for several criteria referring to cause, intention, means and scope of an intervention as prerequisites for a genuine case of RtP. 27 However, these are fairly vague, have a severe dimension of overlap and are hence open to interpretation. Furthermore, since no authoritative institution for their final determination is pondered, 28 in the decentralized international system 29 the danger of unilateral interpretation and enforcement of alleged common necessities is manifest. Moreover, the focus on the "Global War Era", 35 Security Dialogue, (2004) 135, p. 136. 193 proposals on UN reform and thus to take up the concept of RtP. 31 They were supposed to be transformed into concrete strategies, which could be presented to the World Summit in 2005. 32 The Report, 33 published in 2004, directly takes up the idea of sovereignty as implying responsibility towards one's own people and promotes the three-pronged approach of the RtP (prevention, reaction, rebuilding). 34 It also conceives a set of situations in which a RtP is triggered. 35 In addition, the primary responsibility of the home state entails a responsibility of the international community. Yet, it only mentions the Security Council as sole institution to authorize enforcement of an intervention based on the principle of RtP 36 and does not hint any other authority in cases of inaction of the latter. It merely urges its members to refrain from using their veto power if no "vital" national interests are at stake and especially in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights violations. 37 However, this particular part of the report does not relate to the RtP. While para. 138 deals with the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations, only in para. 139 the RtP is enlarged to the community of states as a whole. Emphasize is put on peaceful means, which notably have to be employed "through the" UN. Should they prove inadequate and national authorities are "manifestly failing" to protect their populations, the community of states sees itself "prepared" to take collective action. Yet, this can only take place "through the Security Council". A faculty to act without authorization by the Security Council is not considered.
Definition
The core of the RtP concept, i.e. the substantial overlap of all three documents, hence comprises a secondary responsibility to protect populations from international crimes in case of the inability or unwillingness of the home state to fulfil its primary responsibility to protect. Eventually, this can entail the use of force. 41 Requirements, scope and addressees of the responsibility, however, were subject to significant changes in the short period of four years. In how far this notion of the RtP and its components can be regarded as forming part of international law will be discussed now. 45 While finding the events committed in the enclave of Srebrenica to qualify as genocide as contemplated in Art. 2 of the Genocide Convention, 46 the Court could not ascertain an act of genocide attributable to Yugoslavia. 47 It, however, attested a breach of the duty to prevent genocide. 48 Hence, the ICJ construed the convention in such a way as to impose an obligation to employ all means reasonably available to prevent genocide. 49 According to the Court, the scope of this duty depends on the capacity to effectively influence actions of persons committing genocide, which can be measured by geographical and political links between the respective states. 50 Hence, the duty to prevent genocide, being part of the RtP concept, is entrenched in the international instrument of the Genocide Convention. 52 That states attempt to avoid marking a situation "genocide", 53 shows that they attach value to that assertion and reckon that certain ramifications will flow from it. 54 However, one has to point to the particularities of the case at hand: Serbia was accused of having committed said atrocities, its military forces were already stationed on Bosnian soil and in fact controlled the events. 55 Therefore, it was possible for the ICJ to opine that the means employed have to be lawful 56 without making clear what this means, in particular, if the prohibition of the use of force constitutes a limit to the duty to prevent genocide. 57 Furthermore, the ICJ explicitly states that it does not purport to base its judgement on any other legal source than the Genocide Convention. 58 Basically, treaties are only binding on states parties to it. 59 Nevertheless, the judgement contains further implications: The Genocide Convention codifies fundamental principles, 60 which according to the Court are recognized by all civilized nations and therefore are also binding on non-statesparties and international organisations. 61 Moreover, while genocide for some time was deemed the "crime of crimes", 62 today the opinion of an equivalent gravity of all international crimes takes hold. 63 Hence, this case will probably have an impact on how duties with respect to all international crimes are construed.
B. Other Human Rights Treaties and International
Humanitarian Law a. Significance
Basic notions of humanity, as codified in international humanitarian law, have always constituted part of the international legal order. 64 Hence, the ICJ opined Many rules of humanitarian law… are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law. 65 Since the enactment of the UN Charter, however, the focus of international law has further shifted from states to individuals. 66 The system of human rights protection has advanced from the legally non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights 67 to human rights treaties with 63 Cf. Schabas, W., "Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations", Minority Rights Group International Report (2006) almost global ratification, 68 and regional protection systems on several continents. 69 . Also the ICC Statute, by defining and criminalizing international crimes as minimum consensus of the international community, protects basic norms of human comportment. 70 This "proliferation" has to be seen in the context of the development of an international community with a common value system. 71 Arguably, it is established that the protection of the most fundamental human rights, as well as international humanitarian law, is in the interest of all states and therefore, owed erga omnes. 72 The "Humanization of International Law" 73 can be seen as having proceeded so far that these norms, e.g. the prohibition of international crimes, have been elevated to the level of jus cogens. 74 
b. Consequences
Chapter III of the International Law Commission (ILC)'s Articles on State Responsibility 75 attach particular consequences to grave breaches of jus cogens norms. It can be assumed that violations of international law following from the perpetration of one of the crimes listed in Art. 5 ICC Statute are of a grave nature. 76 It then follows from Art. 41 of the Articles that no state shall recognize such situation as lawful nor act in a way conducive to it. 77 It is especially under an obligation to bring the illegal situation to an end. This duty has to be borne by all states "whether or not they are individually affected" and requires "a joint and coordinated effort" in order to counter the effects of a violation of international law. 78 81 This conclusion cannot be drawn from their bare wording, but rather from the idea that they are an expression of international solidarity. 82 For the ILC in 2001 it was open to question if the duty to cooperate in Art. 41 codified existing rules or reflected the progressive development of international law. 83 Nonetheless, three years later, in its Wall Opinion 84 the ICJ referring to provisions of international humanitarian law and their erga omnes character, in fact deduced a duty to states not party to the specific conflict to bring the illegal situation in the occupied Palestinian territory to an end. 85 However, even if this construction of a duty to react is highly persuasive from a doctrinal point of view, it remains rather vacuous when it comes to implementation. Art. 41 refers to the vague caveat of "lawful means". While unilateral enforcement by a sole state seems to be precluded by the word "cooperation", additional parameters of the RtP have to be ascertained by reference to further international norms.
C. The UN Charter
Of special importance can thus be the UN Charter. Being accepted by 192 states worldwide without reservation, it articulates the international consensus on norms giving structure and content to the international legal order. 86 Human rights are mentioned, inter alia, it its preamble and general objectives in Art. 1 para. 3. They are, however, not listed in Art. 2, enumerating the basic principles of the UN. 81 The main goal of the UN in 1945, the maintenance of peace, 87 was thought to be achieved by forestalling international conflicts. 88 The majority of today's conflicts, however, are internal. 89 The Charter does not explicitly speak of a responsibility to protect. Yet, it constitutes a living instrument open to interpretation in light of humanitarian needs. 90 Therefore, its application and amendment cannot take place without recourse to other rules of international law. 91 a. Art. 39 UN Charter This becomes particularly evident in the discussion around the power of the Security Council to qualify mere internal conflicts as a threat to peace and security. Thus, the concept of "Human Security" as opposed to "State Security" gained significant support. 92 Since the 1990s the Security Council routinely authorizes interventions in internal conflicts without transboundary link. 93 The majority of sta- 97 and since the adoption of the UN Charter the state is not any more the sole authority to warrant basic protection of human rights. 98 The idea of "sovereignty as responsibility" 99 is not new, but has its origins in the construct of the traité social -the concept of the state as a means for the protection of human rights. 100 The genuinely innovative part of the RtP therefore can be seen in the enlargement of such a responsibility from the sovereign to the international community. 101 104 Article 2 para. 4 UN Charter and the customary prohibition of the use of force, which significantly overlap, 105 are still considered as absolute subject only to two narrow exceptions, self-defence under Article 51 and authorization by the Security Council pursuant to Article 42 UN Charter. 106 Even if not considered as absolute, 107 the condemnation of the use of force has been accorded a crucial role in international relations, 108 presumably even the status of jus cogens 109 principle to be weighed against it would have to have at least the same rank. 110 Since the ban on the use of force also protects fundamental human rights, 111 it would be necessary to prove that the RtP in its unilateral mode, would be of at least the same rank.
The significance… of State conduct prima facie inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary international law. 112
Customary International Law, Art. 38 para.1 lit.b ICJ Statute

A. General Standard
Customary international law basically consists of two elements: state practice, backed up by the recognition to be legally obliged to this behaviour, so called opinio juris. 113 State practice must show a high degree of continuity and prevalence. 114 It can also be of relevance which states exactly contribute to this consuetudo, especially if the time-frame for the alleged evolution of an international norm is rather small. 115 Here in particular states would be affected that are politically and economically able to undertake missions, but also those states whose domestic situation would trigger a primary duty to act under the RtP doctrine. 116 Concerning the preventive aspect of the RtP, a multiplicity of states would be addressed. 120 Since the General Assembly by Arts 11-14 UN Charter is only mandated to make recommendations, its resolutions are not directly binding. 121 They can be evidence of opinio juris, though. 122 In order to ascertain if this is the case, an inquiry into content and conditions of its adoption has to be made; it is also necessary to ascertain whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. 123 Resolution 60/1 expressly affirms that "each state has the responsibility to protect its people" and that the international community will intervene, probably with military measures, if the home state is "manifestly failing" on its primary duty. The limitation of the RtP to international crimes as stipulated in Art. 5 of the ICC Statute might even be conducive to the doctrine since these can be further defined by international criminal adjudication. However, no further criteria for intervention are spelled out. In the same vein, the Security Council shall decide on a "case by case" basis. Generally, the provisions are marked by a rather vague language and from a substantial perspective are less vigorous than the previous reports. 124 So was the word "obligation", contained in the original draft, changed into the weaker "responsibility". 125 This does not allow for the conclusion that states were willing to define binding situations in which the RtP would come into action. The unanimous adoption can also be seen as characteristical for a mere political declaration. 126 Consequentially, the General Assembly shall further deliberate about the concept. 127 Furthermore, the RtP is weakened by the fact that no default mechanisms in case of paralysis of the Security Council, the situation because of which the doctrine was actually invented, are pondered. 128 Accordingly, it is not discussed under the heading of "Peace and Collective Security" but "Human Rights". 129 Even though the "Uniting for Peace"-procedure has become an important tool for the General Assembly, it has never actually proposed the deployment of force pursuant to it. 130 Hence, there are arguably good reasons to deduce from this reluctant habit, that states, even if they in principal accept a RtP, were not willing to legally bind themselves by General Assembly Resolution 60/1. 124 This is also true for "abstract" resolutions, not linked to a particular situation constituting a threat to international peace and security, e.g. S/ RES/1674 (2006) (2009) concerning Chad and the Central African Republic expressly confirms the primary responsibility of the respective government to guarantee the security of civilians in their territory. 135 Most recently, S/RES/1894 (2009), dealing with the topic of civilians in armed conflict, however, made reference to S/RES/1674 and unanimously "reaffirmed" paras 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document by explicitly invoking the RtP, which constitutes a remarkable commitment to such a fairly new concept. as long as they are not implemented. 137 The very progressive position of the African Union or the European Parliament, openly assuming their power and preparedness to unilateral intervention in cases of widespread human rights violations, 138 has remained isolated. Furthermore, only few intervening states ever relied on a further exception to the prohibition of the use of force but rather on implied Security Council authorization or extra-legal arguments to justify their intervention. 139 It was therefore awaited with high anticipation if states, four years after the initial adoption of the concept, during the General Assembly debate on the RtP, would still hold on to the concept or eventually abandon its ideas.
ii) States' Affirmation of the RtP -The 2009 General Assembly's Debate on the Responsibility to Protect
-The first report by the Secretary-General
In January 2009, Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon released his report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect". 140 What speaks from this work is strong support for the concept of RtP as agreed on in 2005. He urges that the consensus reached is not open for re-negotiation but ought to be implemented within due course. 141 Responsibility is considered as "the ally of sovereignty". 142 While also conceiving the RtP within a three-pronged strategy, the Secretary-General took a slightly different approach than the ICISS, General Assembly and the representative of Egypt during the General Assembly debate on Human Security, supra note 98 and the following references concerning the General Assembly debate on the Responsibility to Protect. 137 though: The first step shall always consist of the responsibility of each individual state to rectify the grave humanitarian situation in its own territory. 143 Should this prove inadequate, the international community is supposed to peacefully assist the state in protecting its civilians through measures such as confidential or public persuasion, education and training. 144 Merely in a third step the RtP requires timely and decisive response, which can only take place after authorization by the Security Council. 145 Notably, the Secretary puts much emphasis on the invention of an early warning capacity within the UN-system. 146 This report was presented prior to the Assembly debate and therefore served as common starting point for discussion of the RtP.
-The Debate in the Assembly
During the 2009 General Assembly debate dedicated to the follow up of the Millennium Summit, 94 speakers, representing 180 member states of the UN and two observer missions submitted their opinions on the question of a RtP. 147 Some supporters of the RtP had remained anxious about its outcome and feared that the concept would be further diluted by mere diplomatic promises. However, there in fact emerged a generally positive reaction towards the doctrine of RtP from within the plenum. The vast majority of participating states aligned themselves with the opinion proposed of the Secretary-General that responsibility works as an ally of sovereignty. 148 Only some states denounced the RtP as a mere tool of powerful hegemons to subject developing states, 149 equal to humanitarian inter- 143 Cf. ibidem, § § 13 et seq. 144 vention. 150 Also the President of the General Assembly, Mr. D'Escoto Brockmann in his opening speech took a very sceptical approach and admonished the world community that other problems, especially underdevelopment and flawed mechanisms within the Security Council had to be solved first, before attempting to install a general international responsibility to intervene. 151 Moreover, several other states generally supportive of the doctrine warned of double standards. 152 What seems especially pertinent for the topic of this essay is that several states argued the RtP did not constitute a new legal norm, but that the obligations comprised by it were already existing and rooted in other international instruments. 153 Various advocated that there exists the fundamental responsibility to prevent mass atrocities under current international law. 154 On the other hand, some claimed that the RtP was not a binding commitment, 155 but a political or moral call. 156 However, a consensus that emerged from within the vast majority of states was that the task for the future was not to renegotiate the outcome of the 2005 World Summit but implementation of the RtP. 157 ferred to the fact that one of the obstacles of effective realisation is the lack of exact definition of its prerequisites, scope and means. 158 It therefore seems strongly conducive to implementation that virtually all states saw the scope of the RtP as restricted to the four crimes mentioned in the World Summit. 159 But also some other avenues for putting the doctrine into action were routinely mentioned: besides others accelerated ratification and domestication of ICC Statute as well as improving transparency and the promotion of good governance. 160 For an institution often as deeply divided as the UN this seems as a welcome outcome. 161 Yet, again, aside from international crimes, no specification concerning the triggers of a RtP were agreed upon. Furthermore, the pivotal question of the role of the Security Council within the concept of RtP and its interrelationship with other organs of the UN did not find a consensual solution. After the debate it is still not clear if the use of force in case of the latter's inaction could ever be justified. In consequence, the final resolution of the General Assembly only recalls the World Summit and "decides to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect". 162 This outcome might be one of the reasons why the Secretary-General, in his recent report on Human Security, whilst openly referring to the RtP as a commonly known phrase and dedicating a whole paragraph to it, uses a very cautious language when saying that the "use of force is not envisaged in the application of the human security concept". 163
b. Reaction to International Humanitarian Conflicts
Particularly the situation in Darfur with about 2.7 million refugees, 164 is considered a touch-stone of how the international community lives up to its commitments. 165 S/RES/1706 165 S/RES/ (2006 on the humanitarian situation in Sudan also recalles paras 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome. Finally, hybrid peace missions were sent. 166 These troops, however, are deployed with the consent of the Bashir government, poorly equipped and the security situation has severely deteriorated. 167 On the other hand side, the deployment of UN troops after the turmoil in Kenya in 2008 seems to constitute an example for a successful implementation of the RtP after 2005. 168 Yet, there exist similar precarious situations in Congo, Cambodia and Uganda, just to name some of them, where the international community has so far not been able to halt the massive human suffering. 169 No matter of how one will judge upon the progress made in these regions, no military intervention has been explicitly based on the RtP since the World Summit. 170
D. RtP and Deductive Reasoning
It has increasingly been called into question if the mere lack of consistent state practice can hinder basic principles, accepted by the vast majority of states, from crystallizing into positive international law. The rules of international humanitarian law were frequently violated during the last years, somehow paradoxically they nevertheless did not loose on their normative strength. 171 They seem to show that there exist basic values of mankind, which are legally authorative regardless of a completely consistent state practice. 172 Therefore, according to some scholars, the "old" way of inductive reasoning nowadays is superposed by a value-led process of evolution of customary international law. 173 As a consequence, since the importance of the element of state practice in comparison to the element of opinio juris is diminished, 174 conflicting behaviour of individual states cannot forestall the development of customary international law. This could also hold true for the RtP, as it seeks to protect fundamental human rights and there exists a broad consensus about the abominability of international crimes.
Yet, even rules of international law derived by deductive reasoning cannot completely contradict state practice and evolve in opposition to the will of the majority of states. 
E. Interim Conclusions
If a concept is expressly endorsed by 192 states, while it seemed impossible to find even a minimal consensus concerning issues like disarmament and weapons of mass destruction, this represents a significant step, which cannot remain without consequences. 176 Hence, the World Summit can be read as indicative for opinio juris in favor of the RtP. Even if states will generally remain reluctant to impose duties upon themselves, 177 they continuously introduced the RtP in their foreign relations, even after 2005. The creation of the post of a Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and the appointment of Edward Luck as United Nations Secretary-General's Special Adviser for the RtP 178 are evidence of its growing implementation into the UN framework. 179 Also four years after, the vast majority of the world community openly approved the principle of RtP and first attempts to put the doctrine into action were considered.
This, however, finds its limit when it comes to the use of force. Taking into account Art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter as an expression of consensus among the nations, the reservations contained in the HLP-Report, the genesis of the Summit Outcome Document as well as the General Assembly debate in 2009 no sufficiently wide opinio juris sanctioning an erosion of the Security Council monopoly on the use of force can be discerned. 180 Moreover, in the highly sensitive area of military intervention a firm and consistent practice is needed in order to supplant the non-interven-tion principle. 181 It is admitted that that the RtP forms a fairly young concept lacking attention especially for its preventive component. 182 Its invocation by the Security Council represents an important step into the direction of its implementation, which, however, de facto has not taken place. In conclusion, the RtP is not generally accepted as customary international law, yet. 183 
General Principles of International Law, Art. 38 para.1 lit. c ICJ Statute
What will be argued here is that the RtP constitutes a general principle of international law pursuant to Art. 38 para. 1 lit. c ICJ Statute.
A. The "Domestic" Approach to General Principles
What is generally understood by the term of general principles are principles known to the national legal orders of most states. 184 Nowadays, a constitution not providing for core human rights guarantees, is hardly thinkable 185 and protective or positive duties are part of a multitude of legal orders. 186 
B. The "International" Approach to General Principles
Yet, most importantly, the formation of general principles is not confined to the foro domestico any more. 187 As opposed to customary inter-national law, for the emergence of general principles state practice is not constitutive but only state consent. 188 Since international law has changed from a system of coordination to one of cooperation, 189 today it is possible to discern state consensus by deferring to expressions of consent of the international community such as resolutions of the General Assembly, abstract ideas derived from treaty law 190 as well as judgements of international courts and statements of state representatives. 191 The ICJ repeatedly referred to general principles for anchoring humanitarian protection systems in international law. 192 In the emerging international community various values have to be reconciled. 193 Operating on the international plane, general principles now transform extra-positive fundamental considerations of reason into positive law 194 thereby granting to states a fair amount of digression of how to weigh them against each other. Due to their norm-connecting character general principles defy easy definition. 195 This is also owed to their permanent development and concretion through application to particular cases, 196 which brings flexibility to the international order. 197 
Interim Conclusion -the Positive Legal Status of the RtP
As seen above, the constituent elements of the principle of RtP can be found in human rights covenants, especially the Genocide Convention, international humanitarian law and the UN Charter and are engrained in basic values of a developing international community. The RtP, as syn-thesis of current developments of the law on the use of force, 198 tries to reconcile these basic values of international law.
Due to its lack of consolidation in customary international law, in particular its only scarce practical implementation, its contours are poorly defined and cannot be assessed in isolation but only be described by additional norms of international law. A conception as merely declaratory, 199 however, fails to acknowledge the RtP's broad acceptance by states and the UN. Several attempts of implementation by the Security Council are remarkable for such an altruistic concept. 200 Exactly this middle position between lex lata und lex ferenda is distinctive for general principles of international law. Hence, the RtP represents more than a mere political declaration, 201 but can be evaluated as a general principle of international law.
Yet, a responsibility to protect outside the UN Charter mechanism is not part of international law. 202 Due to lack of consensus within the international community, the RtP has not led to a change concerning the monopoly of the Security Council for the authorization of the use of force. 203 Neither when looking to treaty law nor to the opinion or practice of states an erosion of the prohibition of the use of force can be discerned.
IV. consequences-additional Value of the Rtp
Even if the principle of RtP is still too vague to entail specific duties, 204 other consequences can flow from it.
On the one hand, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility is fit into a broader concept and transposed to the international plane, potentially having a catalytic impact on its implementation. 205 Constituting a holistic concept, the RtP puts emphasis on the preventive rather than the reactive answer to conflicts, 206 a component lately neglected within the UN system. 207 Moreover, by endorsing the concept of RtP, all UN member states implicitly accepted the authority of the Security Council to declare grave human rights violations even without trans-boundary effects as a threat to international peace and security. 208 The main advancement, however, will be a reversal of the burden of proof. After the crystallization of the RtP into a principle of international law the pressure of justification for states in cases of inaction in the face of clear signs of impending atrocities has become stronger. 209 The legal limits of power of the Security Council, which also under the doctrine of RtP holds the sole authority on mandating the use of force, are disputed. 210 A curtailment of the veto power is highly improbable. 211 However, the task to maintain international peace and security also comprises a fiduciary responsibility to protect, from which a factual diminution of discretion can flow. 212 The more its implementation will advance, the more each member state of the Security Council will have to explain under good faith aspects why it did not invoke the RtP in one situation while it brought in this notion in other cases. This could eventually lead to the emergence of firm criteria for intervention under the doctrine of RtP.
V. the Way ahead
The outcome of this analysis will be disappointing for those accusing the Security Council of its undemocratic composition, decisions led by pure-ly national interests and paralysis in the face of humanitarian disasters. 213 However, maybe the mistake is to consider the veto-power as the only obstacle to an effective RtP implementation. International law is still formed by states, 214 and no authorization will be issued without states ready to intervene. 215 Much too often, the political will to react and therefore to have to explain one's actions domestically was lacking on behalf of the latter. 216 However, these are the limits of the power of law; the legal quality of the RtP will eventually be gauged by its implementation. 217 If the gap between law and felt justice becomes too wide, international law cannot enforce its protective function. 218 If the international community does not want to face a situation of states attempting to change the law by continuously breaching it, 219 it will have to embrace the moral as well as legal call of the RtP within the system of collective security. Since for all those people suffering from humanitarian crises across this world it will not prove helpful if we will still have to confess:
"No century has had better norms and worse realities". 220 
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